Patents -- Allocation of Territories -- Restrictions on Sublicensees -- Per Se Violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act -- American Industrial Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enterprises, Inc. by Bungeroth, Marc R K
Boston College Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 3 Number 3 Article 7
2-1-1974
Patents -- Allocation of Territories -- Restrictions on
Sublicensees -- Per Se Violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act -- American Industrial Fastener Corp.
v. Flushing Enterprises, Inc.
Marc R K Bungeroth
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law
Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marc R K Bungeroth, Patents -- Allocation of Territories -- Restrictions on Sublicensees -- Per Se Violations
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act -- American Industrial Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enterprises, Inc., 15
B.C.L. Rev. 610 (1974), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol15/iss3/7
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
from the Sherman Act since a mandatory bargaining subject was not
involved.
It thus appears that, as in the situation following the Duplex
decision, Congress must act to resolve some of the judicially-created
ambiguities regarding labor's exemption from the Sherman Act. If
the courts persist in finding the Sherman Act to be applicable to
union efforts to achieve, maintain or exploit its monopoly in the
labor market for union ends, it is suggested that Congress should
clearly state whether violations of the labor laws should ever give
rise to antitrust liability.
DONNA M. SHERRY
Patents—Allocation of Territories—Restrictions on Sublicensees
—Per Se Violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act—American
Industrial Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enterprises, Inc. 1 —A suit for
breach of contract was brought by the plaintiffs, American Indus-
trial Fastener Corporation (American) and its secretary-treasurer
Arthur Herpolsheimer. 2 The defendants, Flushing Enterprises, Inc.
(Flushing) and specified individuals, counterclaimed that the agree-
ment sued upon was void and unenforceable because it contained
restrictions constituting per se violations of the Sherman Act, 3 and
on these grounds moved for summary judgment.
The contract sued upon established a pyramidal relationship
ranging from licensors to subdistributors. At the top of the pyramid,
as licensors, were both Herpolsheimer and American. The original
patent was obtained by Herpolsheimer, who transferred to Ameri-
can the exclusive rights of sale throughout the world. 4 One level
below the licensors was Flushing, who, as licensee, obtained, from
the plaintiffs the exclusive manufacturing and sales rights of the
patented device within a fourteen state territory. Pursuant to the
minimum requirements, the licensee (Flushing) was to establish
distributors subject to approval by the licensor (American); the
distributors in turn were to set up,subdistributors. The distributors
were permitted to manufacture and sell the patented device, pro-
vided they agreed to be bound by the territorial restrictions imposed
362 F. Supp. 32 (N,D. Ohio 1973).
2
 The statement of facts is based on that set out in 362 F. Supp. at 33-35.
3
 15 U,S.C. §§ I, 2 (1970).
For a discussion of the assignability of patents generally, see Deller's Walker on Patents
§§ 335 et seq. (2d ed. 1965). The major distinction between an assignment and a license is that
"an assignment endows the assignee with the right to sue for infringement, while a license
merely provides the licensee with immunity from suits for infringement." Id. § 343, at 377,
See also R. Ellis, Patent Assignments §§ 49 et seq. (3d ed. 1955); R. Ellis, Patent Assignments
and Licenses §§ 54 et seq. (2d ed. 1943).
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on the licensee. Any violation of these restrictions was considered
tantamount to a material breach actionable within the licensor's
discretion.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, addressing itself to the territorial restraints issue, HELD: the
provision in the agreement .that binds the sublicensees to the territo-
rial restraints imposed by the licensor-patentee is per se invalid as a
contract in restraint of trade or commerce within the meaning of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 5 The court reached its conclusion on
the basis of the rule against restraints on alienation, as adopted in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 6 involving a nonpatented
product. The reasoning of Schwinn was expanded to purchasers of
patented products sold by the patentee's licensees, on the basis that
a strict reading of section 261 of the Patent Act' did not permit
territorial restrictions on resales.
This casenote will examine the district court's reasoning and the
practical consequences of this decision. Included will be an analysis
of the statutory basis of territorially restricted exclusive licenses, as
well as the relevant judicial basis. After an evaluation of the per se
rule as applied by the district court, the uncertainties of the decision
will be discussed.
STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE LICENSING AGREEMENT
As a result of the patentee's public disclosure of a new and
useful invention, the Patent Act grants to the patentee, for a period
of seventeen years, "the right to exclude others from making, using,
or selling the invention throughout the United States .. ." 8 These
exclusive rights can be conveyed, subject to certain limitations, to
encompass the whole or any specified part of the United States. 9
The nature of such limitations on a patentee's rights was the key
issue confronting the district court in American Industrial.
At first glance it would appear that the provisions of the Patent
Act are limited by the broad language of the Sherman Act." How-
ever, the two statutes can be reconciled to some extent. Both share
the same basic goal: "the efficient allocation of scarce resources for
362 F. Supp. at 38-39.
6
 388 U.S. 365 (1967). For a discussion of the rule against restraints on alienation, see
text at notes 29-32 infra.
7
 35 U.S.C.	 261 (1970), which provides:
Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by
an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representa-
tives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application
for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States.
8
 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
9
 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
1 ° 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . .. is
declared to be illegal . ."
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those products and services consumers value."" The antitrust laws
seek this objective by promoting "a market-oriented, profit-incentive
process unimpeded by artificial roadblocks to efficiency. P,12
Nevertheless, the antitrust law permits a monopoly when a
monopoly is more efficient. 13 Thus, the temporary patent
monopoly" was established for "the creation of a profit incentive for
allocating resources to the production of a special kind of knOwledge
in order to insure the economical provision of those things consum-
ers value most highly. "'s But the permissible reward to the patentee
must respect "the rights and welfare of the community. " 16 Accord-
ingly, the territorial restraints permitted by section 261 must be
subservient to the antitrust challenge, and confined to afford only a
reasonable reward to the patentee.' 7 However, instead of confront-
ing this issue of territorial restraints squarely by means of antitrust
principles, 18 the court in American Industrial cautiously hewed a
limited path, and went only as far as the venerated rule against
restraints on alienation would permit.
The court's first step was to apply the strict construction test
toward patent statutes, as set forth in United States v. Masonite
" W. Bowman, Jr., Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal 13
(1973).
12 Id. at 2. "The very aim of all the anti-trust laws is to ban conduct and practices which
destroy free and unhampered competition." United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83
F. Supp. 284, 307 (N.D. Ohio 1949), affd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See also Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 237 (1899); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1, 16 (1895).
13 See, e.g., Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), and Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-68 (1911), where the Court tempered the seemingly
limitless scope of § 1 of the Sherman Act by means of a rule of reason.
14 The distinction between a patent and a monopoly—see, e.g., United States v. Dubilier
Condensor Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933)—confuses the issue in suggesting that there really
is no conflict between patent and antitrust law. Adelman & Jaress, Patent-Antitrust Law: A
New Theory, 17 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1971). "[W1hile the patent system certainly does not
restrain competition in inventive activity, but in fact encourages it, it cannot be argued that
patents do not affect competition in existing inventions." Id. (emphasis in original). In
agreement with this view, this note will employ the term "monopoly" in its economic sense,
meaning sole seller.
15 W. Bowman, Jr., supra note 11, at 15.
16 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 329 (1858), cited in United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
17 See Gibbons, Domestic Territorial Restrictions in Patent Transactions and the Anti-
trust Laws, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 893, 896 (1966).
18 The dichotomy of patent versus antitrust standards is well treated in Adelman &
Jaress, supra note 14, at 7-8. In their analysis of bilateral actions in restraint of trade, e.g.,
price fixing, territorial and market divisions, etc., they concluded: "Thus, as a general rule,
bilateral conduct other than the payment and collection of royalties should not be the subject
of an implied exemption and hence must be tested solely under antitrust principles." Id. at 13.
Collaterally, the patent-misuse doctrine prohibits a patentee from extending the scope of
the patent's subject matter. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
135-40 (1969). This doctrine has been applied to achieve equitable results on behalf of the
public interest even in the face of a valid patent. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1942).
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Corp.° There is, however, more than one way of reading section
261 strictly. Professor Baxter has construed section 261 to authorize
merely assignment by the patentee. of his title and interest in his
invention. 2 °
Similarly, in the' early case of Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed
Co., 21 when the Court was still very conscious of the demarcation
line between assignment and license, the Court spoke only of as-
signments whenever it referred to the predecessor of section 261. 22 A
distinction should therefore be made between the patentee's permis-
sible grants to an assignee and those to a licensee. But the court in
American Industrial, unlike the Court in Folding Bed, was not
prepared to deny special status to the patentee-licensee relationship
between American and Flushing.
Contrary to this strict interpretation, section 261 could au-
thorize territorially restricted exclusive licenses, especially if read in
isolated sentences. Choosing this path, the court in American Indus-
trial determined that section 261 permitted each of the parties
named therein to convey an exclusive right to a specified territory,
but not in succession, and that because of a disjunctive reading the
statute did not convey territorial exclusiveness with the patented
product at each subsequent step. 23 However, section 261 definitely
does permit a conveyance in succession—patentee to first exclusive
assignee to second exclusive assignee. Moreover, no mutual exclu-
siveness is required since both the patentee and his assignees may
convey in their respective territories under section 261. It is only
when the patentee has assigned hisj "exclusive" rights in one area
that he cannot assign them again in the same area, for otherwise
"exclusive" would acquire a false meaning. In sum, the district court
correctly determined that the Patent Act did not permit the patentee
to impose territorial restrictions on the sales of his sublicensees. It is
submitted, however, that the court, could have reached the same
determination by a better approach.
JUDICIAL BASIS FOR THE LICENSING AGREEMENT
Having concluded that American's practice was not specifically
authorized by legislation, the court applied what it considered the
relevant judicial proscription to the contractually restrained sale: the
ancient rule against restraints on alienation. 24 Basically, this rule
19
 316 U.S, 265, 280 (1942): "Since patents are privileges restrictive of a free economy,
the rights which Congress has attached to them must be strictly construed . . ."
20
 Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic
Analysis, 76 Yale L.J. 267, 347-52 (1966).
21 157 U.S. 659, 661 (1895).
22 Rev. Stat. 4898 (1875).
23 362 F. Supp. at 37.
"Once the licensee sells the patented product, restrictions on its resale would violate
the ancient rule against restraints on alienation, and -may not be imposed." Id.
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has come to mean that the sale of an item transfers all of the
vendor's rights in that item to the purchaser. This rule was modified
somewhat by the common law doctrine of ancillary restraints,
whereby reasonable restraints on alienation were allowed if neces-
sary to accomplish some legitimate purpose. 25 But it is safe to say
that today the rule against restraints on alienation has attained
utmost reverence. On this rule alone the Supreme Court decided
Schwinn, and the district court American Industrial, both finding a
per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 26 However the
Schwinn case did not provide an automatic answer for American
Industrial, because in Schwinn the Court refused to consider the
rights of a patentee vis-à-vis the "ancient rule." 27
Patent cases have instead traditionally referred to the
exhaustion-by-sale doctrine, rather than the ancient rule against
restraints on alienation. The exhaustion-by-sale doctrine, as de-
veloped in Adams v. Burke, 28 provided that the subsequent use or
resale (after sale of a patented article) could not be enjoined as an
infringement of the patent. The early patent cases, however, dealt
only with infringement suits, and not with the rights of a patentee to
restrict a purchaser by way of contracts. 29
A manufacturing patentee may impose territorial restraints by
selling his patent rights subject to section 261, or by setting up a
licensing system, whereby the licensees would be subject to agency
agreements. 3 ° American, however, was not a manufacturing paten-
tee. Like a manufacturing patentee, it could have followed a licens-
ing plan without any sales except to the ultimate consumer. Instead,
American set up a pyramidal manufacturing-licensing system in-
volving sales between the tiers. The court conceded that this statu-
tory power to sell patent rights superseded the ancient rule, since
"[aifter a sale of the patented product to a licensee, with transfer of
dominion and control over the product, section 261, strictly con-
strued . . . permits a patentee to impose on the licensee territorial
restrictions on the distribution of the product." 31 But after recogniz-
ing that section 261 superseded the "ancient rule" against restraints
23. See Comment, Restricted Distribution After "Schwinn," 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
1032, 1037 & n.29 (1968), which stated that the doctrine of ancillary restraints was applied in
a' limited class of cases usually involving purchase and sale of goodwill interest. See also
United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 410 U.S. 52 (1973). -
2h See Comment, supra note 25, at 1042. "Schwinn, therefore, establishes a new per se
violation of the Sherman Act; one based on an estimation of the antitrust significance of a
violation of the ancient rule against restraints on alienation." Id.
27 388 U.S. at 379 n.6.
28 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873). See also Hobble v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355, 361-62
(1893); Folding Bed, 157 U.S. at 666.
?' See, e.g., Folding Bed, 157 U.S. at 666. "Whether a patentee may protect himself and
his assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a qUestion before us,
and upon which we express no opinion." Id.
3D See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 479, 484 (1926).
31 362 F. Supp. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
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on alienation, the court focused its attention on territorial restric-
tions on subsequent sales. In this context the court ultimately as-
serted that the "ancient rule" limited section 261. 32
This incongruity apparently springs from the relationship be-
tween the exhaustion-by-sale doctrine and the "ancient rule." The
express rights conferred on a patentee by section 261 carve an
exception to the "ancient rule." However, by the "exhaustion doc-
trine" the sale of a patented article exhausts the section 261 patent
rights of the "applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal
representatives" 33 to control the article. 34 Thus, in essence, the
"exhaustion doctrine" denies to subsequent owners the statutory
patent protection afforded by section 261, thereby exposing them to
the "ancient rule."
The court Made no mention of the "exhaustion doctrine," possi-
bly because it was developed in infringement suits rather than
contract suits. However, such a distinction is seemingly illogical.
The policies behind the "exhaustion doctrine" essentially are free use
and alienability, 35 both of which are "directed against the restraints
as such, and are equally applicable to enforcement on a contract
basis."36 Thus, in this respect there is no effective difference be-
tween the "ancient rule" and the exhaustion-by-sale doctrine.
Instead, the court relied on strict construction 37 and policy
grounds to define the scope of contractual rights under section 261,
as affected by the "ancient rule." The underlying policy reason of
section 261 is the concept of just compensation to the patentee. 38
This section permits a patentee to sell a territorial monopoly in any
area that he may not want to monopolize himself. Without the offer
of a territorial monopoly, the patentee's bargaining position for
royalties would be considerably weaker. 39
 Thus, without section 261
a patentee could maximize his monopoly profits only by manufactur-
ing and selling everything himself, or else by making one total
assignment. The anomalous result would be that only the already
powerful individuals or corporations would end up with
monopolies. 40 But section 261 sought to eliminate this anomaly.
32 Id. at 37.
33 35 U.S.C.	 261 (1970).
34 See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
35 Gibbons, supra note 17, at 908-09. Some policy factors in favor of free use and
alienability include a concern over possible harassment of innocent purchasers, the difficulty
of judicial administration of systems of restrictions, the inconvenience to business, the tradi-
tional attitudes of buyers toward the concept of ownership, and antitrust considerations. Id.
36 Id. at 910.
37 See text at notes 19.23 supra.
311 See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926).
39 Baxter, supra note 20, at 347, points out that "[t]he more valuable the invention, the
more likely it is that royalty obligations would force an endproduct price approximating a
monopoly price in the area . . ." As a result he would "compel the issuance of identical
licenses to all qualified applicants with respect to any geographical area for which an
assignment or a license has previously been issued." Id.
40 See Gibbons, supra note 17, at 895.
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Thus, a patentee can exercise his monopoly in one small area him-
self, while still being able to charge the same royalty rates for the
other areas as though he were offering a total territorial assignment.
The court considered these royalties as "the prime benefit protected
by the statute."'"
Arguably, in order to guarantee the patentee a monopoly bar-
gaining position in charging royalties, the patentee should be able to
restrict the sales of the sublicensees (distributors) to the same area as
the respective licensee. For otherwise a sublicensee may sell in the
territory of a second exclusive licensee. However, the licensee's own
sublicensees probably would prefer to sell in any area, since the
sublicensees are in competition with each other in their licensee's
exclusive territory. Such restrictions could therefore weaken a
patentee's bargaining position by diminishing the value of the pack-
age sold to the sublicensee. Moreover, a manufacturing patentee's
concern over reduced profits is unwarranted if the patentee does not
charge an unreasonably high price for his goods, or if he operates in
a reasonably efficient manner. In any event the court correctly
concluded:
Extension of territorial restrictions to the second vendee
can only serve to decrease competition at that level and
artificially maintain higher prices. Its extension does not,
in any meaningful sense; promote greater security of the
patentee's reward for his invention . . . . 42
PER SE RULE
' The court viewed American's extension of territorial restraints
as "not reasonably necessary." 43 However it was not content with
this reasonability of reward test, and applied a per se rule of illegal-
ity. As such the court gave notice that regardless of any reasonably
competitive motives on behalf of a patentee, an extension of territo-
rial restraints to second level vendees would not be permitted. In
adopting a per se rule, courts are not oblivious to the adverse party's
interests, and a balancing is still performed." Nevertheless, courts
are wary of agreements or practices having a pernicious effect on
competition and a lack of any redeeming virtue. 45 Needless to say,
the elements of perniciousness and virtue provide no clear formula
for a per se rule. In this area of uncertainty the district court in
41
 362 F. Supp. at 37.
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 Id.
" See text at note 62 infra.
43
 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5, 6 (1958), where tying
agreements were held to be per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. See also International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394-96 (1947), where arrangements tying unpatented
products to patented machines constituted per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3
of the Clayton Act.
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American Industrial was very much influenced by the Supreme
Court's application of the per se rule in Schwinn. Although Schwinn
did not involve patents, the district court impliedly equated the
patentee's second level vendees with the first level vendees of an
unpatented manufacturer. 46 Thus in both situations territorial re-
straints on the relevant vendee by his respective vendor now result
in a per se violation of the Sherman' Act, assuming interstate com-
merce is involved.
The per se rule was developed to make 'the type of restraints
which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain" and to
avoid "the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged
economic investigation . . . ." 47Although the court in American
Industrial cited ample corroborating cases in which a per se rule
was applied," the question still remains whether a per se rule was
the best solution for the case at hand. As in Schwinn, the critical
issue was the element of title-passing, with the resultant application
of the rule against restraints on alienation. 49 Also as in Schwinn, the
district court offered no economic analysis of the anticipated anti-
competitive effect such vertically imposed territorial restraints 50
would produce. It simply concluded that "[e]xtension of territorial
restrictions to the second vendee can only serve to decrease competi-
tion at that level and artificially maintain higher prices."5 ' How-
ever, 'courts should seek to limit per se prohibitions, under the
Northern Pacific test, only to those agreements with a "pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue . . ." 52
Some laudable exceptions to Schwinn's per se rule include
failing and entering firms. These firms need the additionalcompeti-
tive edge established by the elimination of intrabrand competition
just to stay in business, thereby increasing interbrand competition. 53
46 Second level vendees are those vendees located two levels below the patentee in the
overall pyramidal structure, whereas a second vendee is the purchaser who buys from the
original purchaser. In American Industrial, the second level vendees are the sublicensee s
(distributors) who are actually the first vendees; i.e., they are the first to buy the patented
product from . the manufacturing licensee. As such the second vendee would refer to the
subdistributors or other customers of the distributors.
47 Northern Pac. Ry, v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958).
41 E.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d
252, 263-64 (5th Cir. 1967).
49 388 U.S. al 380. Moreover the Court's concern was not limited to interbrand competi-
tion, but extended also to intrabrand competition. Id. at 369.
50 Vertical restraints are imposed by the top onto the subordinate tiers, as in a "vertical
arrangement by one manufacturer restricting the territory of his distributors or dealers."
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963) (emphasis in original). The Court
in Schwinn contrasted horizontal restraints as those "in which the actors are distributors with
or without the manufacturer's participation." 388 U.S. at 372.
51 362 F. Supp. at 37.
52 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
53 Comment, supra note 25, at 1046. See also White Motor, 372 U.S. at 263. Schwinn
avoided this issue since Schwinn was neither a newcomer nor a failing company. 388 U.S. at
374.
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In American Industrial, however, the court made no mention of any
exceptions to its per se rule. As far as the court was concerned, the
rule against restraints on alienation applied universally. Neverthe-
less, one cannot escape the conclusion that the decision impliedly
contains the same exceptions to its per se rule as did the Schwinn
case. The court relied on the Schwinn decision, and applied the
"ancient rule" the same way. 54 Patentees restraining second level
vendees are now no different than unpatented manufacturers plac-
ing territorial restraints on their vendees. But since Schwinn con-
ceded the exception of new or failing manufacturers, 55 then one can
reasonably conclude that new or failing patentees should likewise be
exceptions to the per se rule.
'The exceptions of new and failing firms exist because the
justifications for the territorial restrictions, as applied to these firms,
sufficiently counterbalance the antitrust policy of competition." As
mentioned earlier, the chief reason for allowing territorial restric-
tions is to assure adequate reward to the patentee." In considering
the effect on competition, however, Gibbons suggested that territo-
rial restrictions encourage small businesses (which have limited
power to attract development capital) because licensees are induced
by the reduced risks to invest capital equipment, specialized pro-
duction techniques and distribution experience. 58 The relevant fac-
tors which courts would weigh under this approach include (1) the
novelty of the patented technology; (2) the length of the development
period, compared to the length of the restriction period; and (3) the
size of patentee and licensee. 59
The exceptions of failing and entering firms have also been
noted by Turner, who seems to favor a rule of presumptive invalid-
ity rather than a per se rule of unreasonability. 6° He goes much
farther, however, than American Industrial, for his presumptive
rule would apply whenever a patentee issues a license with a ter-
ritorial restriction." Otherwise, however, there may be little effec-
tive difference between the per se rule and Turner's presumptive
rule. This apparent anomaly can be explained by the fact that
54 See text at note 46 supra.
55
 388 U.S, at 374.
56 Regarding the balancing between the policies of free competition and monopoly, see
note 14 supra and accompanying text.
57 See text at note 38 supra.
58 Gibbons, supra note 17, at 894-95.
59 Id. at 895.
6° Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y,U.L. Rev. 450, 469-74
(19691.
61 Compare Turner, supra note 60, at 469-74, with Adelman & Jaress, supra note 14, at
17-18. Adelman and Jaress agree with Turner insofar as nonmanufacturing patentees are
concerned, but they differ with respect to. manufacturing patentees. Absent proof of an actual
agreement with his licensees, a manufacturing patentee who does not want to experience
further competition should be permitted under § 1 of the Sherman Act to refuse to license
additional competitors likely to materially harm the patentee's business. Id. at 18.
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historically, a per se rule is not applied as blindly as the name
suggests, as was pointed out in United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp.:
[W]hile the per se rule should be followed in almost all
cases, the court must always be conscious of the fact that a
case might arise in which the facts indicate that an injus-
tice would be done by blindly accepting the per se rule. 62
At this point it should be mentioned that exceptions to an
established per se rule are nonetheless very rarely allowed to over-
ride the rule. Certainly if courts intend a per se rule not to apply to a
certain group, e.g., new or failing firms, then those exceptions
should be clearly spelled out when the rule is established. The
opinion made no mention of any exceptions to the general per se rule
it laid down, and new or failing patentee firms can find but little
consolation in Schwinn and Jerrold. 63
The validity of a general per se rule is subject to dispute. The
Supreme Court in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. warned
that "[i]t is only after. considerable experience with certain business
relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the
Sherman Act."64 The Supreme Court in Schwinn and the district
court in the American Industrial felt confident enough to apply a per
se rule, with the ancient rule against restraints on alienation as its
support. Only four years before Schwinn the Supreme Court in
White Motor Co. v. United States 65 reached a contrary conclusion.
The White Motor case involved sales by a single manufacturer of his
products to distributors, dealers and users, with territorial and cus-
tomer restrictions, as well as price restrictions, imposed on the
distributors and retailers. In discussing the vertical territorial restric-
tions, no mention was made of any "ancient rule." It simply con-
cluded:
We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff
out of which these arrangements emerge .... We need to
know more than we do about the actual impact of these
arrangements on competition to decide whether they . .
should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman
Act. 66
62
 187 F. Supp. 545, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). A legitimate
business purpose was found, permitting the new industry to have required, as part of its sales
contract, a service contract. 187 F. Supp. at 556-57., But this combination was permitted
under the Sherman Act only for a short time, before the legitimate business purpose was
overshadowed by the public policy favoring free competition. Id. at 557-58. See also Ap-
palachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 361, 368, 376-77 (1933), where price
fixing was allowed in a failing industry.
63 The Court in Schwinn specifically excluded patentees from its decision, 388 U.S. at
379 n.6, and Jerrold
- type exceptions are rarely allowed.
6• 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
" 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
66
 Id. at 263.
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However by 1967 the Supreme Court had changed its mind, at least
where sales were concerned.
The Court in Schwinn was conscious of possible justifications
which would override this per se rule. As such, the Court recognized
the uniqueness of new or failing firms. 67 Surely the decision in
American Industrial, which also did not involve a new or failing
firm, should not stand for the proposition that , such firms are now
under the per se rule as applied to patentees. Where an economic
analysis by qualified experts concluded that such exceptions are
beneficial, it is submitted that the district court could not reasonably
have claimed sufficient experience in this area since 1967 to conclude
contrariwise. The district court rightfully made no such claim, but
simply ignored the issue altogether. Thus, as it stands now, the
decision could have a very detrimental effect on new or failing
businesses. To avoid this problem the district court should have
spelled out the exceptions which are implicit in the decision, and
which the court must have recognized in its reliance on Schwinn.
A better solution would have been a presumptive rule, whereby
vertical territorial restrictions by a patentee on second level vendees
are presumptively invalid under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Such
a rule would have virtually the same degree of clarity for business-
men as the per se rule. The advantage of the presumptive rule
would be that the court could specify what factors would overcome
the presumption without necessarily excluding any group com-
pletely. Consequently, some new or failing firms could still be held
in violation of the Sherman Act if the presumption were not over-
come. On the other hand, if new or failing firms are specified as
exceptions to the per se rule, their anticompetitive effect would be
subjected only to the much lighter reasonability test.
In effect there is a considerable difference in whether new or
failing firms are specified as exceptions to a per se rule, or instead
listed as relevant factors in overcoming a presumption. In the
former situation there seems to be no mandate on new or failing
firms whatsoever. With the presumptive rule, however, all firms are
on notice of the compelling policy against vertical territorial re-
straints with sales. Although such notice would have a restraining
effect on some new or failing firms, it would not affect those firms
with meritorious grounds for such restraints.
In sum, the court in American Industrial applied a blanket per
se rule against the contract. As such, it sounded a general notice to
all patentee firms that vertical territorial restrictions imposed by the
patentee through the licensee's sales would not be permitted.
Nevertheless, American Industrial should not stand for the proposi-
tion that Schwinn's exceptions of new or failing firms are eliminated
when dealing with patentees. First, the principal case did not even
deal with new or failing firms, and secondly, the exceptions have
h7 388 U.S. at 374.
620
CASE NOTES
been recommended on justifiable policy grounds. It is submitted that
a better approach would have been a presumptive rule. This rule
would have given the general notice which the district court in-
tended. At the same time, it'would have recognized the uniqueness
of new or failing firms while still imposing a presumption of invalid-
ity. In contrast, although a blanket per se rule sounds a general
notice, it makes no recognition of new or failing firms, and a per se
rule with exceptions has no immediate application to the given
exceptions.
UNCERTAINTIES OF THE DECISION
The decision is actually quite clear regarding the contractual
rights of a patentee, as long as sales are involved. But problems
develop regarding the scope of the term "sale," as applied to various
fact situations. The court in American Industrial viewed a sale of a
product as the transfer of dominion and control over the product. 68
This view differed slightly from Schwinn's definition, which re-
quired transfer of title, dominion or risk with respect to the article. 69
The district court did not, however, purport to expound any au-
thoritative definition of the term "sale," since the issue was not even
raised. The contract itself clearly specified, inter alia, that American
was to receive a ten percent royalty of the licensee's total gross sales
to any sublicensee. The contract recognized that the licensee could
make sales to his sublicensees. Nevertheless, all sales of the sub-
licensees (distributors) had to be bound by the territorial restrictions
imposed on the licensee. The contract was declared void on its face,
without any troublesome inquiry as to whether any sales were in
fact made between the licensee and sublicensee. 7 °
The district court properly attached much significance to the
word "sale" in the contract. Probably the court looked to the con-
tractual rights and expectations of the licensee's purchasers. A
purchase from the licensee, whether by a sublicensee or by an
individual consumer, was for complete title in the patented product.
Part of the price went to the manufacturer-licensee, and the remain-
ing part went to the patentee in the form of royalties.
In- contrast, the Court in Schwinn looked beyond the naked
agreements to the specifics of the challenged practices, 71 and advo-
cated a fact determination to distinguish an agency relationship from
a sale. 72 It is submitted that the combined effect of Schwinn and
66 362 F. Supp. at 36.
69 388 U.S. at 379.
79 362 F. Supp. at 38-39.
11 388 U.S. at 374.
72 Id. at 380, where the Court espoused the following test:
Where the manufacturer retains title, dominion, and risk with respect to the product
and the position and function of the dealer in question are, in fact, indistinguishable
from those of an agent or salesman of the manufacturer, it is only if the impact of the
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American Industrial creates a one-way street from agency agree-
ments to sales agreements. As such, an agreement labelling the
relationship an agency could on its facts be deemed a sale, but not
vice-versa. This approach does not violate any rights of the
manufacturer-vendor. Arguably a manufacturer should be entitled
to the specified restraints under an agency relationship if the agree-
ment is labelled as such, and if he assumes higher costs as a
principal instead of a vendor. But if a fact determination concludes
that he really was a vendor (without the right to impose restraints),
then he simply has ended up with those rights actually due and no
more. Conversely, if a manufacturer-vendor specifically by agree-
ment sells an article, but the conditions of sale are such that he still
bears many of the burdens of a principal, then he simply has struck
an unfavorable sale and should not be permitted to alter the terms of
a completed sale so as to impose territorial restraints.
Uncertainty still reigns over the permissible contractual rights,
of either a patentee or a nonpatentee, under an agency relationship
rather than under a sale. American Industrial sheds no light on this
question since the case was decided on the basis of the term "sale" in
the contract." As a result of Schwinn, any vertical territorial re-
straints in an agency arrangement are subject to a reasonability test
-under the Sherman Act. 74 Unfortunately, a gray area exists between
an agency relationship and a sale, and the courts will thus have to
choose between the reasonability test and the per se rule. At this
point it should be mentioned that an agency relationship is no shield
from the per se rule. In United States v. Masonite Corp.," the
Supreme Court found a per se violation of the Sherman Act, even
assuming del credere agency agreements. Although the case was
unusual in its facts, 76 the Court refused to be bound by labels in a
contract. 77
Although patentees have been conferred special status, as in
United States v. General Electric Co., 78 the scope of their contrac-
tual rights under agency agreements is still undefined. The Supreme
Court recognized that the patentee would come within the operation
confinement is "unreasonably" restrictive of competition that a violation of § 1
results from such confinement, unencumbered by culpable price fixing.
Id. (emphasis added),
73 But see Security Materials Co. v. Mixermobile Co., 72 F, Supp. 450, 456 (S.D. Cal.
1947), where a territorial restriction on a purchaser was enforced. The court recognized the
rule that a purchaser from the patentee or an authorized licensee does not commit infringe-
ment by violating territorial restraints on use or resale. Nevertheless it carved an exception to
the rule against restraints on alienation where the purchaser himself was a manufacturing
licensee for another territory.
74 388 U.S. at 380.
75 316 U.S. 265, 274 (1942).
76 The case involved price regulations on a patented product which were "based on
mutual agreement among distributors of competing products, some of whom had competing
patents . . . ." Id. at 280.
77 Id. at 274.
75 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
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of the antitrust laws when "he steps out of the scope of his patent
rights and seeks to control and restrain those to whom he has sold
his patented articles . . . ." 79 Nevertheless, in a "genuine agency"
case, a patentee-licensor may limit the licensee's "method of sale and
the price . . . provided the conditions of sale are normally and
reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's
monopoly."80 The General Electric case is still law today" even
though a price fixing arrangement by anyone but a patentee is a per
se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 82 Yet nothing in the
decision purports to grant a patentee special status over sublicen-
sees.
In looking at a contractual arrangement, the Supreme Court in
General Electric followed a two-step approach: (1) is there a sale or
an agency relationship? 83 (2) if an agency relationship exists, are the
restrictions in the licensing agreement valid?84
 The case of Simpson
v. Union Oil Co." added a third step: if there is a valid private
contract, does the overall result of the agency setup violate federal
antitrust policy? The Court in Simpson recognized that "[t]he in-
terests of the Government also frequently override agreements that
private parties make," such that "a consignment, no matter how
lawful it might be as a matter of private contract law, must give
way before the federal antitrust policy."" This broad antitrust pol-
icy statement in Simpson was, hOwever, specifically confined to
non-patent fact situations. 87
 Thus the limited approach of General
Electric is still the applicable law in agency relationships involving
patents.
As a final point of interest, it should be noted that in the area of
sales between the manufacturing patentee and first vendee, Ameri-
can Industrial leaves many questions unanswered. For example,
should a patentee be permitted to place territorial restrictions on all
licensees, even if they are manufacturers of unpatented end products
incorporating the patented component?" As it stands now, a paten-
tee has considerable control over his first vendee. It remains to be
74 Id. at 485.
" Id. at 490.
al But see United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 316 (1948), where four of
the eight justices concluded in a concurring opinion that General Electric should be overruled.
R2
 See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 47 (1960); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
as 272 U.S. at 479, 484.
" Id. at 488, 494.
	 •
as 377 U.S. 13, 18, 21-22 (1964).
56 Id. at 18.
R7
 Id. at 23. "But whatever may be said of the General Electric case on its special facts,
involving patents, it is not apposite to the special facts here." Id. Nevertheless, in a strong
dissent, Justice Stewart concluded: "It is clear, therefore, that the Court today overrules
General Electric." Id. at 29 (dissenting opinion),
" See Gibbons, Domestic Territorial Restrictions in Patent Transactions and the Anti-
trust Laws, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 893, 903-04, 911.12, 926 (1966), where the author
concludes in the negative.
623
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
seen how far the rule against restraints on alienation erodes this
control.
CONCLUSION
As a result of American Industrial, a patentee may not by
agreement impose territorial restraints on his sublicensees' sales if
the sublicensee purchases, the product from the manufacturing licen-
see. The district court correctly determined that section 261 did not
permit these restraints. In the process, however, the court overly
strained the meaning of section 261. Instead the court could have
construed section 261 as' inapplicable to licensees of an exclusive
right.
The conjunction of the ancient rule against restraints on aliena-
tion and the exhaustion-by-sale doctrine gave rise to a limitation of
section 261. From a policy viewpoint, the court's strict construction
was favorable because the reward to the patentee was deemed too
speculative to permit the anticompetitive agreements.
In applying the per se rule, the district court was very much
influenced by Schwinn. However, a presumptive rule of invalidity
would have been preferable, to accommodate the meritorious excep-
tions of some new of failing patentee firms while still sounding a
. general notice.
American Industrial still leaves many issues unresolved. As in
Schwinn, problems arise as to the scope of the term "sale." As a
result of these two cases, an agreement labelling the relationship an
agency will be judged orilthe facts to see if a sale is involved. But a
contract labelling a transaction as a sale will not be scrutinized to
see whether the more lenient reasonability test for an agency should
be applied. Furthermore, i the court did not challenge the patentee's
territorial control over the licensee's sales, nor did the court dwell on
the patentee's degree of territorial control over his sublicensees
under a "valid" agency relationship.
MARC R.K. BUNGEROTH
Commercial Law—Confession of Judgment—Hearing Required on
Voluntariness of Waiver Before Entry of Judgment—Virgin Islands
National Bank v. Tropical Ventures, lnc. 1 —Defendants, Tropical
Ventures, Inc. and World Resorts, Ltd., obtained a loan from
plaintiff, Virgin Islands National Bank. The loan was evidenced by
a demand note and secured by a mortgage on properties in St.
Croix. 2
 As part of this transaction, defendants signed a power of
38 F. Supp. 1203 (D.V.I. 1973).
1 Id. at 1205.
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